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Introduction 
Two narratives have emerged to describe recent healthcare reforms in the United States of 
America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). One narrative speaks of revolution,1 that the 
adoptions of the Affordable Care Act 2010 (ACA) in the US, and the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 (HSCA) in the UK, have resulted in fundamental, large-scale philosophical, 
political and legal change in the jurisdictions’ respective healthcare systems.2 The other 
narrative evokes evolution,3 identifying each new legislative scheme as a natural development 
of existing governance structures.4 Policymakers in both the US and UK face the problem of 
a healthcare system which, as traditionally envisaged, cannot offer universal access to 
healthcare at a reasonable, or politically acceptable, price.5 In an attempt to solve this 
problem, policymakers shop around, with the result that each of the two jurisdictions’ 
reformed healthcare system includes features normally associated with a free market 
healthcare model, as this has been seen to increase quality and lower costs, but both also 
demonstrate characteristics of a state run model, which provides a safety net for citizens and a 
buffer against the commodification of health.   
Here, we argue that neither the revolutionary nor the evolutionary narrative adequately 
characterizes these policy initiatives since, although each jurisdiction has effected significant 
change, neither has detached its reformed healthcare system from the moorings of its 
traditional healthcare model and neither takes adequate account of the broader settings in 
which those reforms have occurred.6 The narrative of revolution pays insufficient attention to 
party politics and the extremes of partisan rhetoric, and lacks a considered exposition of the 
political bargaining behind reform and the crafting of legislation intended to balance past and 
future manifestations of a healthcare system. On the other hand, we are skeptical of the 
evolutionary narrative, based on its claim that the ‘new’ systems are typologically consistent 
with their predecessors, which misrepresents the reforms’ extent.  The introduction of the 
individual mandate requiring individuals to purchase healthcare insurance in the US,7 and the 
marketization of the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK,8 pushes each system into 
previously uncharted territory, namely the middle ground between free market and 
government run (social insurance) healthcare.9 Forced to choose, for reasons which will 
become apparent we would dismiss the revolutionary narrative in favour of its evolutionary 
counterpart.  We do, however, consider the evolutionary narrative too narrowly focussed and 
insular.   
 
In seeking to examine and explain the jurisdictions’ apparent drive to the middle, we propose 
a distinctive evolutionary narrative, that of convergence, which, as well as adopting a less 
parochial perspective on developments in healthcare policy, also situates the reforms 
politically, constitutionally and comparatively. The idea of convergence in relation to 
healthcare systems is not, in itself, unusual or unknown.  Wendt et al. note, for example, a 
“tendency of convergence from distinct types towards mixed types of healthcare systems”10 
occurring in the two jurisdictions.  Convergence does not have to be purposeful or co-
ordinated since the emergence of similar characteristics in healthcare systems, or any system, 
may occur entirely independently.11 To illustrate why convergence better describes healthcare 
reform in the UK and the US, we will explore the reforms’ interaction with each 
jurisdiction’s fundamental political principles, as expressed in their respective constitutions.12  
Constitutions have played a crucial role in both jurisdictions.  By policing the revolutionary 
elements of reform, they guarantee that policymakers have not overlooked fundamental 
political principles,13 while ensuring that political opponents do not dismantle reform so as to 
render it merely, and mildly, evolutionary.14 
Roadmap 
To substantiate the idea of convergence this paper is divided into three parts. Part One 
demonstrates that, where superficial analysis of healthcare politics in the US and the UK 
might indicate that this paper’s proposed thesis of convergence is outlandish, deeper inquiry 
demonstrates otherwise. The revolutionary narrative is revealed as a false reality, built upon 
an over-reliance on the observation of formal voting patterns and unquestioning acceptance 
of extreme political rhetoric as truth. Looking behind this representation of the reform 
process, the positions of independent politicians and intra-party concessions of extreme 
positions, for example, indicate that healthcare politics has been far more subtly conducted 
than the idea of revolution suggests. To suggest that ‘revolution’ has taken place in either 
jurisdiction thus overplays the form and rhetoric of healthcare politics at the expense of the 
nuance, bargaining and balance that underpin its reality.   
In Part Two, we analyse the narrative of evolution. This analysis drives us towards the 
conclusion that evolution insufficiently reflects the nature of the change brought about by the 
ACA and HSCA. Aspects of both jurisdictions’ reformed systems are impossible to reconcile 
with their traditional model of healthcare and, therefore, the idea of linear evolution does not 
truly explain what has occurred. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have incorporated 
elements of the other’s system, meaning that neither reformed system can truly be considered 
a direct, transformational evolution of the pre-existing regime. Given the apparent failures of 
the revolutionary and evolutionary narratives, we conclude Part Two by advocating an 
offshoot narrative of evolution - that of convergence.     
Convergence is not, however, a path easily trodden. The primary reason for this is that in 
order for convergence to occur, elements of it must be revolutionary, albeit tempered by the 
presence of limiting mechanisms.  Part Three therefore adds to the existing literature on 
healthcare convergence by suggesting that constitutions and constitutional law undertake the 
important and, in this narrative sphere, often overlooked role of policing and restraining the 
most revolutionary elements of reform. Constitutions and constitutional law function to 
ensure that aspects of reform are not so revolutionary that they undermine a jurisdiction’s 
fundamental principles and values, as expressed by its constitution.   
Part 1: Rhetoric and Reality in Healthcare Reform 
Contemplating the ACA, Dolgin and Dietrich described American healthcare reform as 
"sweeping",15 Barnett, Gazino and Stewart as “unprecedented”,16 and Blackman as 
“comprehensive”.17 In the UK, Davies warned that, this time, medicating the healthcare 
system was “for real”,18 suggesting that, unlike previous reforms, the HSCA truly established 
a free market in healthcare. More forcefully, Pownall contended that the coalition 
government’s “strong commitments to neoliberal values”19 underpinned the reforms, which 
began “a new chapter for the NHS”20 where the HSCA’s increased role for private enterprise 
marked a “significant departure from the traditional model of publicly provided care.”21 All 
of these accounts of reform accentuate the perception of revolution.  We cannot, however, 
begin to make an assessment of the weaknesses in that narrative without first outlining, 
briefly, the reforms themselves.  
1. Healthcare Reform Realised 
Despite their distinctive approaches, Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, and 
President Barack Obama - the architects of new millennium healthcare reform in the UK and 
US - were described respectively as having written a “political suicide note”22 and embarked 
on a “political suicide mission”23, reflecting the danger inherent in attempting to question 
articles of faith.24  It is, of course, impossible to detail the HSCA’s 309 sections and 12 
schedules, or the ACA’s 1,900 pages here.  As such, below are described those elements of 
the acts identified as effecting, in the UK’s case, a shift from nationally tax-funded, budget-
limited, equal-access healthcare provision, towards a market-based system, and vice versa for 
the US. 
a. The UK’s Health and Social Care Act 2012 
The HSCA received Royal Assent on 27 March 2012 and implemented the coalition 
government policies set out in the White Paper Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS25, 
albeit those policies had now been through the democratic mangle and suffered death-by-a-
thousand-cuts in a brutal legislative process.26  The HSCA came into force in April 2013, 
changing both the consumption and provision functions of the NHS, and, for the first time, 
placing health policy on a statutory footing, ensuring a degree of resistance to fleeting 
fashions and executive whim.27 
 
The HSCA introduced General Practitioner (GP) commissioning via local Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) as the principal means of procurement of services.  CCGs 
administer the lion’s share of the NHS budget.  Individual CCG’s budgets are set by NHS 
England, which holds CCGs accountable for obtaining value for money in the procurement of 
services and for improving outcomes for patients.  Neither NHS England nor the CCGs may 
engage in anti-competitive behaviour.28  Both have a duty to promote patient choice.29  The 
more localised approach of the HSCA is further reflected in its transfer of responsibility for 
local health services from central to local government authorities (LAs) and Health and Well-
Being Boards (HWBs), a species of LA sub-committee comprised of CCG representatives, 
LA directors of services and local councillors, responsible for the strategic direction of health 
and social care services in the geographical area covered by its LA.  The HSCA also created 
Public Health England, an executive body of the Department of Health designed to undertake 
the Secretary of State’s public health functions, and expanded the role of Monitor, from 
simply regulating NHS service providers, to economic regulator overseeing access to and 
competition in the NHS.30  Thus, the HSCA hands Monitor responsibility for, inter alia, 
protecting and promoting the interests of healthcare service users; licensing NHS healthcare 
providers; addressing anti-competitive practices and behaviour in the provision of healthcare 
services31 and working with NHS England to set and regulate NHS service costs through a 
national tariff.  Responsibility for the pricing of healthcare was thereby removed from the 
Department of Health and placed on a statutory footing.  The Secretary of State for Health 
retains ministerial responsibility, however, and is accountable to Parliament for the provision 
of a health service, as well as having two key duties under the HSCA.  Firstly she must 
promote a comprehensive national health service in England and, secondly, must foster 
autonomy where this is consistent with the interests of the health service, a crucial one of 
which is, now, the maintenance of competition by way of a market in healthcare. 
b. The US’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010 
The ACA was signed into law on 23 March 2010.  Its constitutionality was upheld by the 
Supreme Court on 28 June 2012.  In broad terms the ACA effects change in five areas.  
Firstly, it expands the Medicaid programme, already the largest source of categorical 
entitlement health funding for the socially disadvantaged, by increasing the number of 
eligible citizens.  The Act increases federal funding to meet States’ costs in expanding 
Medicaid coverage.   Secondly, employers of 50 or more workers will face increased tax 
liability if they do not provide health insurance for their workers.  Thirdly, insurance is 
expanded, and significant numbers of low and middle income earners brought within its 
scope, via the ‘Health Insurance Marketplace’, a federal or state-administered, regulated, 
online facility where citizens and small businesses can see, compare and purchase private 
health plans and, provided that they qualify, receive federal assistance with premium costs.  
The ACA also introduced the individual mandate, which requires Americans to maintain 
“minimum essential” health insurance coverage.  In particular, those not covered via their 
employer or government must meet the requirement by purchasing insurance privately.  Non-
compliance with the mandate attracts a penalty, to be paid to the Internal Revenue Service.  
Finally, providers of private health insurance may not refuse or limit coverage on the basis of 
existing or predicted health conditions and, whilst they may vary their rates by age, insurers 
may not take account of past or predicted future use of health services.  The ACA thus 
introduces more government regulation into American healthcare via the expansion of social 
insurance. 
 
Leflar describes the reform arena as being characterised by “polarized ideology, complex and 
brutal politics, [and] perverse economics.”32 Alongside the academic community, 
policymakers have made strong rhetorical statements about the revolutionary nature of 
healthcare reform.  Opposition politicians in the UK stress the future dominance of free 
market principles in the NHS,33 whereas in the US political criticism focuses upon how 
reform will increase state involvement in healthcare.34  Critics declare that the reforms 
selected fit better with philosophical concepts regarded as alien to the model of healthcare to 
which they are accustomed and attached and, more fundamentally, alien to the principles and 
values that underpin their jurisdiction’s political landscape.35 The use of these alien 
philosophical concepts is an attempt to expose reform as underpinned by foreign values, 
which are orthogonal to the host’s. Most often, the rhetoric is loaded and is an expression of 
pure ideological caricature lodged at the extremes of an untrammelled free market,36 or a 
fully centralised socialist system,37 or perhaps reversion to some less desirable point in 
history.38 Ideologues on both sides appear entrenched in their refusal to acknowledge the 
compromises that emerge from the “wide and fertile space between Utopia and 
Armageddon”39 where, in reality, healthcare reform is worked out. As a result, accounts of 
healthcare reform confuse and undermine reasonable and legitimate political dispute and 
debate.   
Reform is also a response to empirical fact; healthcare in both the US and the UK is 
unaffordable. In the US, healthcare accounts for 17.9% of GDP.40  Moreover, pre-ACA 
16.3% of the US population did not have health insurance41 and, consequently, was unable to 
access the market. Meanwhile, in the UK, spending on the NHS accounted for 18% of the 
2013 government budget, at roughly £139 billion.42 It is only appropriate, therefore, in an 
economic climate in which government coffers are running low, that policymakers should 
look to reform healthcare and acknowledge that there is nothing inevitably symbiotic about 
reform and revolution. 
2. The Revolutionary Narrative as Represented in Legislative Voting Patterns.  
In the UK, the House of Commons conducted 18 votes during the passage of the Health and 
Social Care Bill.43 In 17 of these votes, no Member of Parliament (MP) from the 
Conservative Party - the majority party of the coalition government - voted against the Bill, 
and no Member of Parliament from the opposition Labour Party, voted for it. A similar 
pattern can be seen in the voting record of the Conservative Party’s coalition partner. Across 
18 votes, only 35 of a potential 795 Liberal Democrat votes were cast in rebellion. The 
uniformity of voting, for and against the HSCA, is highly indicative of the partisan cleavage 
provoked by the proposed reforms.  We have, it should be noted, eliminated one vote from 
this analysis. On 7 September 2011, the House of Commons considered the HSCA’s 
provisions on independent abortion advice.44 This was the only vote which exhibited 
irregular, cross-party voting patterns, something to be expected given that, routinely, on 
abortion, MPs are permitted to vote with their conscience. 
Even in the upper chamber, the House of Lords, which is considered far less “partisan” than 
the Commons “most obviously due to the presence of the Bishops and Crossbenchers, but 
also because the parties operate in subtly different ways”,45 an almost unbridgeable gulf 
existed between the Labour and Conservative/Liberal Democrat peers. The House of Lords 
divided on 32 occasions to consider the HSCA. Only one Conservative peer, Lord James of 
Blackheath, rebelled,46 meaning that, of 4,463 Conservative votes cast over the 32 debates, 
only one was cast against the government. Likewise, in opposition, 4,645 Labour votes saw 
only one cast against the Labour party whip - Lord Warner electing, on 12th October 2011, 
not to reject the Bill at second reading.47 Meanwhile, out of the 1,981 votes cast by Liberal 
Democrat peers only 37 were cast in rebellion. These statistics hardly vindicate Russell’s 
claim that the House of Lords is less partisan than the House of Commons but they do lend 
support to the claim that healthcare reform provokes division on party lines.48 A bare reading 
of voting in the US’s legislative chambers reveals a similar pattern to that in the UK. In 
consideration of the ACA and the Affordable Healthcare for America Act, clear bi-partisan 
lines can be drawn between Republicans and Democrats, which is evident in both Houses of 
Congress.49  
The House of Representatives voted on healthcare reform eight times.50 Republicans cast 
1,407 votes in total, of which six ignored the party whip. Rebellion in the House was more 
prevalent amongst Democrats where, out of 2,028 votes, 183 were revolts. Democrat rebels 
therefore accounted for 9% of all votes cast in the House of Representatives. This statistic is 
not remarkably out of step with Representatives in the 111th Congress, who rebelled 6.1% of 
the time.51 Rebellion is, in any case, more prevalent in American politics where a strong 
separation of powers ensures a weak connection between the executive and members of the 
legislature.52 Moreover, the two-year election cycle often drives members of the House of 
Representatives to eschew the party line for the purposes of satisfying electors53 and 
responding to Madison’s demand that they should feel “an immediate dependence on, and an 
intimate sympathy with, the people.”54 Whilst at face value, rebellion in the House of 
Representatives appears more extreme than in the House of Commons, it is, as indicated 
above, not out of step with American political culture and is much more typical of American 
than British politics. When considered contextually, therefore, it appears that rebellion on the 
ACA was indicative of rebellion in American politics generally.    
Similar levels of partisanship can be recognised in Senate voting patterns. The Senate voted 
on the ACA 35 times,55 though we have discounted two of these votes from our analysis.  
Both took place on December 15th 2009 and concerned the importation of drugs, on which 
matter Senators voted based on local necessity rather than party line. On the other 33 voting 
occasions, just as in the House of Representatives, Republican and Democrat Senators 
seldom rebelled: Republicans recorded 19 rebellious votes out of 1,292 cast and Democrats 
67 out of 1,961. Senators, therefore, voted almost uniformly with their party.       
Analysing votes cast in Parliament and in Congress clearly indicates rigid partisan divide, 
with politicians rarely willing to oppose their party’s position on healthcare reform, and 
almost universally voting along ideological lines.  It is obvious that merely accessing the 
voting patterns in both countries might lead to the conclusion that the reforms were radical 
and divisive rather than convergent and consensual.  Of course, it could be suggested that 
partisan division like this is predictable in democracies with political parties56 but scrutinising 
voting patterns does not paint the full picture. Exploration of the extremes of political rhetoric 
demonstrates hyper-partisanship within healthcare politics beyond the normal partisan 
divides that exist in other policy areas. It will be shown that, to a degree, this is charged by 
the belief that reform cannot be reconciled with pre-existing, and fundamental, political 
values. There are, however, several factors that appear to demonstrate that reform was not, 
perhaps, as revolutionary as partisan voting and rhetoric indicate. Within the constraints of 
this essay, we will examine two such factors. Firstly, we explore the position of independent 
members of the legislatures on reform. Secondly, we consider how intra-party bargaining 
prevented some of the more revolutionary aspects of reform from occurring.  
3. Reconsidering the Revolutionary Narrative 1: Independents   
The first evidence that may be marshalled against the revolutionary thesis is the reaction of 
independent members of the UK and US legislatures. Crossbench peers in the House of Lords 
and Independent Senator, Joe Lieberman, in Congress, offer a unique insight into why reform 
is not revolutionary. The role these groups and individuals played in reform, and how they 
supported certain aspects of reform but not others, is indicative of the fact that reform is less 
revolutionary than bi-partisan debates convey.  
In the House of Lords, over the 32 voting occasions, Crossbench peers accounted for 942 
votes cast in favour of reform, while 774 cast their vote in opposition, equating to a 55% to 
45% split in favour of reform.57  Crossbench peers are those members of the House of Lords 
who have no party allegiance. Of course, it does not obviously follow that because 
Crossbenchers have no party connection, they are ideologically neutral politically.  Russell, 
cites the left-wing suspicion that; 
“large numbers [of Crossbenchers] sit independently; they listen independently; they 
weigh the arguments independently; and then they independently vote Conservative... 
The fact that people call themselves independent, with great respect, does not make 
them so”58 
but concludes that, “the views of the contemporary Crossbench group are far more balanced 
than sceptics … believe … Independent Crossbench members, on average, placed themselves 
squarely at the centre of the left– right spectrum.”59 The fact that Crossbench peers divided so 
evenly with their support indicates that the HSCA is not revolutionary but far more moderate 
than superficial analysis of party voting patterns and political rhetoric suggests.   
A similar, though less statistically robust, conclusion emerges from considering how Joe 
Lieberman, Independent (formerly a Democrat) of Connecticut, used his position as the 
Democrats sixtieth Senate vote to ensure that the eventual healthcare reform package was 
more moderate than federal government intended.60 Lieberman’s significance becomes 
apparent once the importance of having the support of 60 Senators is considered.61 During the 
111th Congress, Senate standing rules required a three-fifths majority to end a filibuster, that 
being a delaying tactic minority groups within the Senate could use to prevent the passage of 
legislation.62 If the Democrats could not command 60 Senate votes, Republicans could 
obstruct the ACA’s passage. Having Lieberman’s support, therefore, would allow the 
Democrats to censure any Republican opposition mobilised in the cause of delaying reform. 
Lieberman’s vote would, thus, make reform easier to achieve, giving him significant 
bargaining capacity and a key role in producing a more moderate healthcare reform 
programme.63 Lieberman opposed the idea of a public option within the ACA.64 A public 
option would have introduced a government-controlled health insurance package, operating 
in direct competition with the private insurance market.65 Shapiro observes that Lieberman 
“killed the public option"66 by his refusal to block a filibuster if Democrats included a 
government run healthcare option within the ACA.  To gain Lieberman’s support overall, 
Democrats had to drop the public option from the ACA, thereby tempering one of its more 
radical provisions.   
As Kang has identified, Lieberman’s threat was clear, and present: “Lieberman [has] made 
regular practice of siding with Republicans on high-profile concerns, including the failed 
filibuster of Justice Samuel Alito's nomination, the Terri Schiavo controversy, and Bush's 
Social Security privatization proposals, among others”67 all of which signify that the 
Democrats had to take Lieberman seriously as “holding Barack Obama to ransom”68 over the 
public option. Lieberman has been declared “crucial”69 and “essential”70 not only to 
mustering the 60 votes necessary to defeat Republican filibusters but also to careful reform 
by terminating any, revolutionary, public option. 
4. Reconsidering the Revolutionary Narrative 2:Party Members 
Within the US and UK’s governing parties, the political bargaining that occurred to produce 
legislation capable of carrying enough support to reach the statute books also provides 
evidence of how reform is not revolutionary. Bargaining was most apparent, and most 
necessary, in the UK, where the government comprised a coalition of Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats.71 Political bargaining in the US was more subtle, manifesting in 
modifications made by President Obama to appease and satisfy the demands of numerically 
strong southern, conservative Democrats without whose support in Congress the reforms 
would not have been written into law.72 What is clear is that, in both jurisdictions, reformers 
were coaxed into modifying their proposed programmes – by dropping the more controversial 
components – in order to give them a more consensual appeal within their party.  
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition has governed Britain since May 2010. Whilst 
overlaps in the parties’ political ideologies exist, making coalition viable, this is not the case 
in the realm of healthcare. The easiest way to appreciate the marked difference between the 
parties’ approaches to healthcare governance is via brief analysis of their 2010 election 
manifestoes. Whilst there was no desire to dismantle the nationalised system, the 
Conservative Party sought healthcare founded on “decentralise[d] power … real choice… 
doctors and nurses accountable to patients, not to endless layers of bureaucracy and 
management… that puts targets before patients.”73 Its manifesto stated that, if elected, it 
would “give patients more choice and free health professionals from the tangle of politically-
motivated targets that get in the way of providing the best care.”74 From the Conservative 
perspective, central to reforming the NHS was the introduction of a more ‘fully-fledged’ free 
market, with the ideas of freedom, choice, and entrepreneurship at the heart of that vision. 
Had the HSCA been a piece of legislation passed by a purely Conservative government, it is 
likely that its free market principles would have been stronger but its coalition partner put the 
brakes on.75  
A key difference between the Liberal Democrat’s manifesto and the Conservative Party’s is a 
shift in language, away from freedom and choice, and towards “fairness” and “democracy”.76 
The Liberal Democrats stress that the NHS, being “built on the basic British principle of 
fairness”77 had, at its core, the idea of citizen empowerment rather than fiscal savings. While 
it could be argued that the two manifestoes arrive at the same conclusion, namely a more 
decentralised and people-driven health service, the means employed to achieve that end 
differed. As the King’s Fund reported, the distinction is ideological, with “[t]he 
Conservatives believing in markets … [and] … the Liberal Democrats believing in 
democracy.”78  
The Liberal Democrats are proud of how their role in coalition government softened the free 
market principles embedded in the HSCA.79 In fact, to highlight the moderation of the 
Conservatives on the free market, the Liberal Democrats published a list of their 
achievements in relation to the HSCA: 
“We have… (1) enshrined stronger duties on healthcare bodies to promote the 
integration of health and social care and to tackle health inequalities… (2) made sure 
that competition in the health service will be based on quality of care and not on 
price… (3) guaranteed that … any profit from private patients will be used to improve 
services for NHS patients… (4) preserved the Secretary of State’s legal and political 
responsibility to maintain a universal comprehensive health service.”80  
Another way in which the Liberal Democrats motivated mindful reform was through the 
establishment of the NHS Future Forum,81 a large-scale government listening exercise that 
sought out professional, patient and public opinion and which, in an unprecedented hiatus, 
occurred mid-way through the legislative passage of the HSCA.82 Through this listening 
exercise, which provided evidence of levels of public support, the Liberal Democrats 
managed to achieve a raft of changes to the Bill relating to the new NHS’s structure,83 its 
regulation,84 the extent of its privatisation,85 its emphasis on social care,86 the creation of a 
more democratic and decentralised service,87 and the shoring up of the Secretary of State’s 
constitutional responsibility for the health service.88     
The interaction between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats during the reforms’ 
development demonstrates that the HSCA is not as revolutionary as some politicians suggest. 
Firstly, through both parties having approached reform from different ideological positions, 
the HSCA blends the Conservative commitment to the free market with Liberal Democrat 
fidelity to fairness and democracy. Secondly, the reforms’ faltering legislative passage 
demonstrates the reality of the pulling and hauling that occurs in the reconciliation of the 
parties’ antithetical tendencies. Thirdly, so successful was the Liberal Democrat assault on 
the marketisation of the NHS that the party made a point of visibly indicating its ameliorating 
influence on the excesses of the proposed reforms.    
In the USA, things worked slightly differently. President Obama achieved reform during the 
111th Congress, when the Democrats had control of all political branches of the federal 
government; the executive, the Senate and the House of Representatives. This level of control 
meant that the Constitution’s mechanisms, which provide for divided government,89 could 
not restrict Obama’s policy choices. Passing such a statute during the 112th or 113th Congress 
would not have been possible, since the Republicans now control the House of 
Representatives.90 Yet in the 111th Congress President Obama still could not pass the Act he 
fully desired because of the more decentralised character of the American political party.91 
President Obama was required to craft a package of reforms that would gain the support of 
the more conservative, and typically southern, members of his own party.92  
As Adams and Gibbs note, “The Democratic Party in the United States is far from 
monolithic. The divide between liberal and conservative members of the Democratic Party 
became more apparent with the healthcare debate that took place in 2010.”93  There is faction, 
then, which Adams and Gibbs perceive as creating five party caucuses - “Black, Hispanic, 
Women, Progressive and Blue Dog”94 - which disagreed over the course of reform that 
should be taken.  The most interesting of these caucuses for exposing the non--revolutionary 
character of the ACA is Blue Dog. 
Blue Dog Democrats are “conservative”.95  It is their mission to bring a “common sense, 
bridge building … to forge middle ground bipartisan answers to challenges facing the 
country.”96 In the 111th Congress, the Blue Dog Caucus made two demands of the ACA. 
Firstly, it must be cost neutral and, secondly, government involvement in healthcare 
regulation had to be minimised.97 Jacobs and Skocpol believe that when the House and 
Senate voted on their final healthcare reform packages, concessions to Blue Dog Democrats 
emerged in both pieces of legislation.98 For example, when the House passed its final bill it 
included a watered down public option and a unified national insurance exchange.99  The 
restriction of abortion services under the ACA is a further key example of a Blue Dog 
concession.100 Senator Ben Nelson, the most conservative of Democrats, threatened to 
withdraw his support for the ACA if it provided federal funding for abortion.101 Nelson and 
the Obama Administration managed to negotiate a compromise position: the ACA does not 
require that insurance plans fund abortion and states may pass laws preventing plans included 
within the state controlled exchange scheme from including abortion.102 The result is that no 
federal government money will be spent on abortion and states have the ability to opt out of 
promoting insurance plans that include abortion services. This was a genuine compromise, as 
Ben Nelson had previously supported the House’s Stupak–Pitts Amendment, which would 
have introduced a more pro-life emphasis to the ACA.103  The most compelling evidence of 
concession to Blue Dog Democrats, and of the moderate nature of the ACA, is that, even with 
the Democrats in overall control of government, Obama did not attempt to create an 
ambitious project like Hillarycare.104  Moreover, the eventual omission of even a public 
option indicates the ACA’s relative conservatism.105 Whilst we noted that, with his threatened 
refusal to prevent a Republican filibuster, Senator Joe Lieberman played a large role in 
killing off the public choice provision, Blackman highlights the distaste for the public option 
across the whole Democratic Party.106 Progressive Democrats could not wholeheartedly 
support it because it was not radical enough, whilst conservative Democrats could not 
countenance further government involvement in the regulation of healthcare. As a result, the 
regulatory framework that ultimately emerged was heavily moderated by the requirement that 
any reform package crafted by President Obama must carry the support of his own party.      
Evidently, the reaction of independents, and the way in which each jurisdiction’s governing 
party had to fight to gain the support of those within its own ranks, undermines the claim that 
the US and UK’s recent healthcare reforms are revolutionary.  The dominance of the 
revolutionary narrative has not merely been limited to the number of legislative positions 
taken, however, since it extends to the magnitude of qualitative rhetoric used in opposition to 
reform. A second significant problem with the revolutionary narrative is that it focuses too 
heavily on politicians’ partisan rhetoric, particularly in interpreting opponents’ proposed 
reforms as radical.  
Part 2: Dismissing the use of The Other’s Healthcare System as a Political Device for 
Revolution 
The most striking examples of revolutionary rhetoric are to be found where opponents of 
reform measure their existing, and fetishized, healthcare system against the evils of The 
Other. The Other refers to the fabled, and often demonised, version of the comparator 
jurisdiction’s healthcare system. We note, however, that factual accuracy is often a quality 
that is absent from these rhetorical exchanges.  In both supporting and opposing reform, 
politicians have made inaccurate or misleading claims about and false portrayals of The 
Other. For example, it is very rare for politicians in the UK to appreciate that any social 
welfare safety net exists within the US to aid those unable to afford care whereas, in fact, The 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 1986 provides all individuals with 
access to the most essential healthcare services, regardless of their purchasing power.107 
Similarly, politicians in the US present the UK’s healthcare system as coercive, with a 
Stalinesque control over life or death decisions,108 but whilst, in the UK, individuals must 
contribute to the national healthcare system, they may still opt for private healthcare by 
joining a private insurance scheme.109 There are two apparent reasons for politicians to 
discredit The Other. Firstly, each jurisdiction’s healthcare system is a powerful political 
symbol. In the UK, the 2013 Ipsos-Mori British Future poll110 found that, in a list including 
the armed forces, its 2012 Olympic Team, the Royal Family and the BBC, the NHS makes 
people most proud to be British:  
“we ought to take pride in the fact that, despite our financial and economic anxieties, 
we are still able to do the most civilised thing in the world—put the welfare of the 
sick in front of every other consideration.”111 
Moreover, in 2012 the UK informed the world of the NHS’s centrality to its citizens’ lives, 
through its inclusion in the Olympics opening ceremony.112 Similarly, in the United States, 
privatised healthcare has enormous cultural, constitutional, political and philosophical 
significance.113  Consistently, polls demonstrated that President Obama’s reforms provoked 
opposition because they represented government intrusion on individual liberty114: 
“American political culture places an extraordinarily high value on liberty for both 
individuals and corporations to form political and economic and social associations as 
they wish. This is what gives a presumptive legitimacy to the behaviour of insurance 
companies. Health insurance was viewed by many as just another product provided in 
the market in accord with the rules of the market.”115 
Fleck argues that this is because “the deepest value shaping the policy process was respect for 
individual and corporate economic liberty, and non-interference by government in making 
healthcare financing decisions.”116 Whereas, in the UK, there is a shared sense of pride in the 
free-at-the-point-of-access NHS, in the US the people are willing to accept that “some serious 
health needs go unmet, but they regard such failures as unfortunate and regrettable side 
effects of a system of liberty, not injustices that would warrant the coercive interventions of 
government.”117 
Clearly, then, healthcare politics is constrained by much deeper considerations than service 
provision alone. As a result, choices made in healthcare policy and regulation also stand for a 
jurisdiction’s belief in key political ideas, among these, justice,118 equality,119 
individualism,120 and collectivism.121 Developing this sentiment, Fleck notes that  
“[N]o simple story can be told about the public or private funding of healthcare… No 
one component can be dominant … especially if our ultimate practical political goal is 
to have a conception of healthcare justice that can be understood and endorsed by 
reflective citizens in our liberal pluralistic society.”122 
Inevitably, any shift in the structure of healthcare governance will result in strong political 
opposition but reform needs to be viewed through a more refractive lens. In any pluralistic 
society, including the US and UK, change is normally of degree, readjusting how healthcare 
replicates society’s understanding of justice, equality, individualism, and collectivism.   
1. Use of the Other in revolutionary discourse  
Here are two typical examples of the use of The Other in debate;   
“It is unfortunate that much of the campaign we have experienced has relied on 
convincing the public that the NHS is set to be privatised. Many are convinced that 
we are heading for an American-style system and I am sure that we have all had e-
mails saying that we do not want to see that.”123 Baroness Hussein-Ece, Member of 
the House of Lords. 
“The government picks winners and losers in the United Kingdom, and the 
government picks who lives and who dies. That doesn't seem to be a healthy solution 
for healthcare.”124 Mr. Poe of Texas, member of the House of Representatives. 
Both of these statements cultivate the belief that The Other’s healthcare system is 
diametrically opposed to their own and founded upon a concept of justice incompatible with 
the values that underpin their domestic healthcare system.  One of the worst criticisms that 
can be levelled at the proposed reforms is that they will produce a new system akin to The 
Other. Baroness Hussein-Ece clearly indicates the British public’s discomfort with, and 
distaste for, the perceived inequities created by the privatisation of healthcare, US-style. MP 
Frank Dobson, addressing the House of Commons, further exposes the differences between 
British and American anxieties over healthcare reform. In complete contrast to Poe, Dobson 
views the removal of government intervention and an increased free market as opting for a 
loss of freedom. For Dobson, less government involvement in healthcare will result in fewer 
people accessing the care they require. Asking the rhetorical question, who will benefit from 
the HSCA, Dobson responds;  
“The answer is American health corporations, almost all of which have been indicted 
in the United States for defrauding US taxpayers, doctors, patients and, sometimes, all 
three. I asked the Secretary of State whether he would rule out any of those outfits 
obtaining contracts, and I am afraid his answer was, ‘I can't say.’”125 
The principles at the heart of our healthcare systems do, of course, differ.  Broadly speaking, 
the NHS was founded upon equality and American healthcare on championing free market 
individualism.  Poe’s statement focussing on the loss of liberty flowing from the ACA is a 
clear testament to that. In a bid to highlight some Americans’ paramount concerns, Poe 
catalogues the perceived horrors of a system like the NHS, driven by strong government 
intervention, where healthcare is: “rationed based on cost, age, and survivability rate”126 and 
where the government will “decide that someone can't have a cancer treatment because it's 
too expensive.”127  
Building the case against the ACA because of its disregard for individual liberty, Mr. Price, 
Representative from Georgia, stated; 
“Yesterday was an historic day in this Nation. The problem for our citizens is that it 
was historically dark ... Our Founders are weeping over the incredible vote taken 
yesterday that was an affront to federalism, an affront to individual liberty, and an 
affront to freedom.”128  
Even when we do appreciate the same principle, such as ‘liberty’, transatlantic understanding 
of the term’s meaning differs.  Opponents of the UK’s HSCA view the introduction of free 
market principles as bearing potentially negative consequences for liberty.129 Liberty would 
be undermined because individuals’ access to healthcare would become limited by their 
ability to pay.130  Demonstrating the mistrust of private healthcare, Baroness Williams of 
Crosby recalled how, in the US, despite the advice of the National Institute of Health on the 
possibility of damaging side effects, doctors continued to administer a test that helped 
identify prostate cancer because of its profitability. Williams saw this as “a frightening 
account of the conflict between medicine and its values and the pursuit of profit”131, noting 
that underpinning opposition to the HSCA was “[a]n abiding theme [of] privatisation and the 
Americanisation of our health service.”132 
In the US, opponents of the ACA claim that it offends liberty for conflicting reasons. They 
contend that, through commandeering people into purchasing health insurance, the ACA 
limits an individual’s liberty by denying them the choice to forgo joining the market.133 Judge 
Vinson, in the Northern Florida District Court, summed up this interpretation of liberty, when 
he claimed that; 
“It is difficult to imagine that a nation which began, at least in part, as the result of 
opposition to a British mandate giving the East India Company a monopoly and 
imposing a nominal tax on all tea sold in America would have set out to create a 
government with the power to force people to buy tea in the first place.”134  
Of course, the presentation of these caricature versions of The Other could be easily 
dismissed, were it not for the fact that even proponents of reform were in on the act. For 
example, Earl Howe, the government minister for the HSCA in the House of Lords, noted 
with interest the common concern that the HSCA could lead to an “American-style market 
free-for-all, with competition harming patients' interests”135 but countered:  
“Let me be clear about what the Bill does and does not do. The Bill does not introduce 
a free market for all. It does not change competition law, or widen the scope of 
competition law. It does introduce a framework in which competition can be 
effectively managed as a means to benefit patients. … The Bill does not do anything 
which might or could lead to the privatisation of the NHS. What it does do is create a 
level playing field between different providers, putting an end to the subsidies and 
guarantees given to the private sector under the last Government.”136 
Important to note are Lord Howe’s attempt to distance the HSCA from a US-style system of 
healthcare governance, his categorical rejection of reform resulting in “the privatisation of the 
NHS”137 and his clarification of the HSCA as introducing only minimal, targeted reforms to 
bolster beneficial competition. 
The fact that proponents of reform deem it necessary to differentiate between their system 
and the other jurisdiction’s is evidence of a shared belief, across the political spectrum, in 
ideological differences between the two. When assessing the credibility of reform, 
proponents, rather than point out the virtues of the other system, tried distinguishing their 
reforms from the other’s system. In order to sell reform, proponents clarified how changes 
maintained their system of healthcare, while cherry picking elements of The Other to 
reinforce their own. Proponents were never willing to accept that reform resulted in 
fundamental departure, nor did they go so far as to recognise that reform inevitably led to the 
possibility of convergence between the two systems.  
2. Dismissing the Rhetoric of the Other and Considering Evolution 
Revolutionary rhetoric seems disingenuous when it is considered that current opponents of 
particular reforms have, at one point or another, been the proponents of similar reforms. 
Political rhetoric should be dismissed as just that, political. It is partly because opponents of 
reform, through their previously held political convictions, have supported similar reforms,138 
that we also dismiss the revolutionary narrative in favour of evolution.  
In the US, for example, the individual mandate’s provenance is as a Republican, conservative 
think-tank led policy.139 Blackman states that former Republican Speaker of the House, Newt 
Gingrich, supported an individual mandate to purchase health insurance up until May 
2011.140 The scheme was originally proposed by the Heritage Foundation to the Republican 
Party in 1993 as a free market alternative to Hillarycare.141 Supporters of the individual 
mandate within the Republican Party, would, however, "throw consistency to the wind in 
their pursuit of partisan gains”142 once the Democrats proposed a healthcare system based on 
an individual mandate in 2008.143 Moreover, and federalism arguments aside,144 the only such 
scheme adopted at state level in the US has been that of Massachusetts’ Republican 
Governor, Mitt Romney.145 It, therefore, seems impossible to accept the claim that the 
individual mandate is revolutionary and an ‘unprecedented’ socialisation of healthcare. Quite 
the opposite, with both parties having supported it, the introduction of the individual mandate 
seems like a natural evolution. 
Similarly, in the UK, opening the NHS to free market principles has been a goal not merely 
of Conservative governments, but also Labour.146 Speaking on the 60th anniversary of the 
NHS former Conservative Health Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, reflected on Tony Blair’s 1997-
2007 Labour government:  
“Labour secretaries of state have got away with introducing private sector providers 
into the NHS on a scale which would have led the Labour Party onto the streets in 
demonstration if a Conservative government had ever tried it. In the late 1980s I 
would have said it is politically impossible to do what we are now doing. I strongly 
approve.”147 
Davies adds credibility to Clarke’s taunt, stating “[s]uccessive governments have ... 
encouraged the idea that there should be competition, or at least contestability, in the 
market.”148 While Blair’s government briefly ran a very centrally controlled health service 
from 1997-1999, it quickly “reverted to the Conservatives’ more market-like approach.”149 
Blair’s Labour government was responsible for two key, market based initiatives. Firstly, it 
established NHS Foundation Trusts, which transformed government-controlled hospitals into 
autonomous institutions.150 Secondly, it created Monitor, which ensures that the NHS remains 
competitive. It seems unlikely that, with the Conservatives now at the helm as the coalition’s 
majority party, this drive will change.151 The Labour Party’s 2010 general election manifesto 
had, in any case, promised to “expand patient choice, empowering patients with information, 
and giving individuals the right to determine the time and place of treatment.”152 
Consequently, the Labour Party’s track record in government, combined with its manifesto 
commitment to competition, evokes the disingenuity of the Republican’s switch.     
What has become apparent is that policymakers in the US and UK no longer see a largely 
free market system or completely state controlled system as capable of solving healthcare 
regulation’s principal dilemma, controlling the cost of health while ensuring universal levels 
of coverage.153 Policymakers have instead mixed aspects of internal system evolution with 
the inclusion of revolutionary transplants154 from the other’s system. In pursuit of 
equilibrium, they have introduced concepts conventionally conceived as abrasive to their own 
constitutional order. As a result of seeking to tackle the same problem, policymakers in the 
US and the UK have moved towards establishing two ideologically similar healthcare 
systems, yet it is important to note that the two systems remain substantially different 
because, whilst they are moving closer ideologically, they began at opposite ends of the 
spectrum.    
Evolution does not, however, fully convey what is occurring here because it does not describe 
the direction of reform. What is interesting is that both jurisdictions’ chosen path of evolution 
is towards The Other. In both jurisdictions evolution is convergent, moving towards the same 
- middle - ground. In light of this, we agree with Glennerster and Lieberman’s contention 
that, while The Other’s healthcare system may be viewed as a “curiosity at best and an 
abomination at worst”155 there are, in fact, fewer differences between the two than ever 
before. What has occurred is evolution, so much so that it could be argued to amount to 
“hidden” convergence.156 Behind this notion is what Glennerster and Lieberman perceive as a 
reverse flow of ideas, meaning that while the two systems took remarkably different forms 
after the Second World War, since then piecemeal policy changes have been informed and 
underpinned by the successes of The Other.157 “Powerful forces” such as “economic, 
political, and demographic challenges… have bent these apparently opposite systems”158 to 
The Other’s shape.  
There is one aspect neglected in Glennerster and Lieberman’s study which is the role played 
by constitutions and constitutional law in this process. We contend that constitutional actors, 
including constitutions themselves, have, and will continue to, play a key role in evolutionary 
convergence. Constitutional law has provided a necessary and principled buffer, preventing 
reformers from engaging in outright revolution. The presence of this buffer is imperative in 
healthcare reform because policymakers do not know the middle ground for which they 
search. On neither side of the Atlantic can politicians profess to have the solution to 
providing universal access to healthcare whilst maintaining the financial viability of the 
healthcare system. Evolutionary convergence is, therefore, blind and the quest for equilibrium 
likely to take many twists and turns.   
Constitutions and constitutional law have a role to play in policing this search. A constitution 
is, after all, our “plan for politics”159 and all policy choices must be made in the context of 
this plan. If a policy choice conflicts with the plan, either the policy must be altered or the 
constitution amended. In this sense it is a primary task of a constitution to act as a roadblock 
to potentially revolutionary policy.160  
We will demonstrate through consideration of the Supreme Court of the United States 
(SCOTUS) judgment in National Federation of Independent Small Business v Sebelius161 
(NFIB) and the UK’s House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution report on the 
HSCA,162 how constitutional law and politics have suppressed the revolutionary elements of 
reform. In both instances, within the scope of their respective powers, constitutional actors 
have measured healthcare proposals against their constitution and acted to diminish the 
revolutionary components of reform.     
 
Part 3: Constitutional Law as Balancer  
We have argued elsewhere that the US and UK’s healthcare reforms do not necessarily ‘fit’ 
(to varying degrees) their respective constitutions.163 The argument goes that the reforms’ 
constitutional fit has been rationalised post-hoc, and that policymakers did not sufficiently 
consider constitutional mores when drafting reform legislation. While we do not believe that 
reformers paid sufficient attention to the constitutional dimension when crafting new 
healthcare systems, we see that, post-reform, constitutions and constitutional law have taken 
centre stage.  Proponents and opponents of reform have sought to confirm or cast off parts of 
the new system on the basis of compatibility with the jurisdiction’s underlying political 
philosophy, as represented in its constitution, or ‘plan for politics’.164 As plans for politics, 
constitutions capture the framework commitments and values of a society, setting the ground 
rules for future generations. Constitutions, while largely ill-considered in the creation of these 
systems, have played a significant role in setting, revising and policing the boundaries of 
reform.  
1. Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Judgment in National Federation of 
Independent Business v Sebelius 
In NFIB the Attorney Generals of 27 state governments,165 NFIB (a non-profit organisation, 
representing over 350,000 small businesses), a variety of academics, pressure groups and 
right leaning policy units, in 81 amicus briefs, petitioned SCOTUS to declare the ACA 
unconstitutional. Their primary contention was that the ACA’s constitutionality rested upon 
Congress being granted powers “unprecedented and unbounded”166 under the American 
Constitution.  
Two provisions within the ACA shaped the oppositions’ cases. Firstly, the mandate that all 
individuals must purchase healthcare insurance rested upon the allegedly questionable 
assumption that Article 1 powers provided Congress with the authority to make that 
demand.167 Secondly, the withdrawal of funding from States for refusing to accept the 
enlarged Medicaid state-funded health insurance scheme under the ACA was argued to 
contradict South Dakota v Dole,168 which sought to limit Congress’s spending power for the 
purposes of maintaining America’s federal structure of government.169 If SCOTUS agreed, 
opponents invited a ruling that would hold the whole of the ACA unconstitutional on the 
basis that it would be impossible to sever these elements and for the Act to work.170 At their 
core, these arguments assert that the ACA undercut American federalism by granting 
institutions of the federal government powers in excess of those “few” and “defined” powers 
granted within the Constitution.171     
While SCOTUS in NFIB did not hand opponents the victory they wanted, its ruling was not 
entirely favourable to the federal government either. In fact, the SCOTUS judgment has gone 
a long way to ensuring the ACA’s ideological conformity.172 That is, the SCOTUS decision 
has made the ACA less antagonistic to the American concept of liberty than it had been prior 
to the judgment.173  Right leaning libertarian Professor Randy Barnett contends that “we lost 
on healthcare. But the Constitution won”174, though a more moderate conclusion might be 
that post-NFIB the ACA comports better with the Constitution’s commitment to liberty.  
An example of this toning down comes in the SCOTUS’s answer to the first question, 
whether Congress has the power to mandate individuals to purchase health insurance? 
SCOTUS determined that Congress did not possess the power to force individuals to 
purchase health insurance under the Commerce Clause,175 but it could tax those who did not 
under the Taxing Power.176 Prima facie, this might indicate that the court is merely splitting 
hairs, after all the conclusion remains that Congress can introduce a mandate but Barnett 
suggests why this adjustment, while not what opponents wanted, could still be regarded as a 
victory:   
“this power [to Tax] is not nearly as dangerous as the commerce power that was 
rejected. Congress can punish violations of its commerce power regulations with 
imprisonment. But under the tax power, the worst that can happen is a fine. And if 
lawmakers try similar legislation in the future, everyone will know that Congress is 
raising taxes and can fight back politically.”177  
Consequently, rooting the individual mandate’s constitutionality within the Taxing power 
makes the ACA less revolutionary within America’s constitutional structure. By resting its 
legality on the taxing power, SCOTUS reduced the ACA’s coercive strength,178 meaning that 
the individual mandate was no longer a command from the federal government to purchase 
healthcare insurance but, depending one’s perspective, either a tax break for those who do, or 
a tax on those who do not. The SCOTUS decision, to a lesser degree, undercut the 
Constitution’s federal division of powers by framing the individual mandate as within a 
power which, it claimed, Congress always had.179 The NFIB judgment should thus be seen as 
a decision that balances the legitimate need to find a solution to the healthcare dilemma of 
cost versus access against the equally legitimate need to protect values central to the 
Constitution.  
Rivkin, Casey and Grossman have dismissed NFIB as “fig-leaf federalism”, which is “long 
on principles and platitudes but short on enforcement”.180 We disagree with this statement, 
and view SCOTUS’s approach in NFIB as an attempt to reduce any abrasion between the 
ACA and the Constitution. Evidence of this, and proof that the Commerce Clause’s 
substitution for the Taxing Power was not merely window dressing, emerges from how the 
Court dealt with the second question. 
The ACA required states to increase Medicaid access to those below 133% of the poverty 
line and under the age of 65.181 The federal government would fund this expansion fully 
through 2016, after which, federal support funding would gradually decrease to 90% with 
state governments footing the remaining 10% of the cost. Section 1396c decreed that, if a 
state did not agree to the expansion of Medicaid it would forfeit all Medicaid funding 
(offered in this and previous conditional spending programs), which accounted for 10% of the 
states’ overall budgets. The issue SCOTUS had to confront was whether the condition 
imposed by s1396c was “economic dragooning [leaving] the States with no real option but to 
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”182 If s1396c did “pass the point at which ‘pressure 
turns into compulsion’”183, SCOTUS had to consider whether the ACA “runs contrary to our 
system of federalism.”184  
By a majority of 7-2, SCOTUS held that Congress could not withdraw all Medicaid funding 
from a state if that state refused to accept the ACA’s new terms. It could only refuse any 
additional funding. Chief Justice Roberts held that, if Congress could withdraw all funding 
from state governments for their refusal to accept added terms, it would allow them to hold “a 
gun to the head”185 of the State governments and turn the conditional spending clause into 
compulsion. Section 1396c’s level of coercion was, for the majority, unacceptable because 
the financial consequences of refusing to accept expansion would be so dire that it deprived 
state governments of a legitimate choice in whether to accept the new scheme or not.186  
Chief Justice Roberts outlined how American federalism relies on states having the choice to 
decline involvement with a federal spending program, concluding that “when the State has no 
choice, the Federal Government can achieve its objectives without accountability.”187 While 
the textual basis for this argument seems weak, it is an issue of first principle, namely how 
best to maintain the federal division of powers mandated by the Constitution. Guerreo has 
summarised the logic behind finding the Medicaid expansion as unconstitutional, in the 
following way;  
“in the US federalist system of dual sovereignty, states are sovereign entities, and it is 
inappropriate for the federal government to operate in ways that ignore that fact by 
compelling or conscripting state officials into carrying out federal projects.”188  
Two further considerations underscore NFIB’s credentials as equilibrium discovery between 
healthcare’s policy requirements and America’s constitutionally entrenched structure of 
government and political principles. Firstly, Chief Justice Roberts clarified that the coercive 
power of the Spending Clause, here deployed to withhold federal funding from a State for its 
failure to adopt a federal spending program, should not create a federal black hole, affording 
Congress unlimited power.189 Congress should not able to use the Spending Power to justify 
policies it could not undertake through its enumerated powers.190 If the Spending Clause 
permitted Congress the power to compel state governments, it would make any attempt to 
regulate federal power via any other part of the Constitution worthless. Secondly, while a 
majority of the Justices voted for eliminating part of the Medicaid provision, a majority of 
Justices did not vote for dismantling the expansion entirely. The four dissenting Justices 
(Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy and Alito) would have gone further and held the Medicaid 
expansion to be wholly unconstitutional, however.191 These Justices believed the coercive 
element to be essential to the Medicaid expansion and thus refused to sever s1396c from the 
rest of the ACA. This is a far more radical position than that adopted by Chief Justice 
Roberts.192 In merely striking down s1396c the rest of the statute was saved, upholding the 
constitutionality of the majority of the ACA, which was not constitutionally abrasive, while 
reframing and striking down those elements which were.  
2. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution and Ministerial 
Responsibility  
In the UK, constitutional concerns over the HSCA have also led to modification. A major 
difference to note is in that the UK’s forum for constitutional amendment has, thus far, been 
the legislature rather than the judiciary. Unlike in the US, where the SC settled the policy 
initiative-constitutional fidelity equilibrium, in the UK the House of Lords in its legislative 
capacity performed this task.193 The cause of this institutional shift is the departure from 
America’s judicially enforceable constitution, which limits Congressional power, to the UK’s 
political constitution, whereby Parliament possesses unlimited sovereignty and its decisions 
are typically viewed as incontestable.194  Whilst political developments resulting in, for 
example, membership of the European Union and the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
appear to signify a limiting of parliamentary sovereignty, that is by legislative, rather than 
judicial, initiative and may be undone.  One subsidiary issue of note is that this shift in forum 
means equilibrium is achieved in the UK at an earlier stage than in the US. With the HSCA, 
constitutional debate occurred in the upper chamber of Parliament in reaction to the 
government’s plans as outlined in the lower chamber.  
The House of Lords Committee on the Constitution (HLCC) had the same kinds of 
reservations about the HSCA as SCOTUS had about the ACA and, similarly, wanted to 
ensure that reform fitted within the UK’s prevailing, and longstanding, constitutional 
arrangements and structure.195 The HLCC’s formal remit is “to examine the constitutional 
implications of all public bills coming before the House; and to keep under review the 
operation of the constitution.”196 With the HSCA, the HLCC wanted to confirm that the post-
reform NHS, as a government-owned service, would maintain provision for democratic 
accountability to Parliament.197 Accountability for government services, through 
parliamentary supervision, is imperative to the UK’s constitution. Without ministerial 
accountability for activities occurring within the NHS, a democratic deficit would emerge.198 
Decisions concerning the spending of public money, raised through taxation, would be 
devoid of any political control or repercussions if that democratic linkage was not 
maintained.199 Severing ministerial accountability from the NHS would create a 
constitutional black hole. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the British constitution rests upon 
the notion that Parliament is omnipotent, and its decisions democratically legitimate, because 
it is the only branch of government that is representative of the people.200  
Section 1 of the original version of the HSCA, which passed House of Commons scrutiny, 
read; 
(1) The Secretary of State must continue the promotion in England of a 
comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement—  
(a) in the physical and mental health of the people of England, and  
(b) in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness. 
(2) For that purpose, the Secretary of State must exercise the functions conferred by 
this Act so as to secure that services are provided in accordance with this Act. 
The HLCC contested this clause because the provision it replaced - s3 of the National Health 
Service Act 2006 - contained a functionally equivalent clause that imposed a wider duty on 
the Secretary of State: 
(1) The Secretary of State must continue the promotion in England of a 
comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement—  
(a) in the physical and mental health of the people of England, and  
(b) in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness.  
(2) The Secretary of State must for that purpose provide or secure the provision of 
services in accordance with this Act.  
Where, under s3 of the NHS Act 2006, the Secretary of State had to “provide or secure” 
health services needed, by s1 of the original Health and Social Care Bill the Secretary of 
State would merely need to “secure that services are provided”. Moreover, while s3(1) of the 
NHS Act 2006 charged the Secretary of State with responsibility for providing “throughout 
England, to such extent as he considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements… 
hospital accommodation, other accommodation, medical, dental, ophthalmic, nursing and 
ambulance services”201, Clause 10 of the HSCA shifted this duty onto the newly established 
Clinical Commissioning Groups, thus severing a direct link to the government.  
Voicing its concern over these changes, the HLCC stated;    
“The combination of these changes matters, constitutionally, because it is not clear 
whether the existing structures of political and legal accountability with regard to the 
NHS will continue to operate as they have done hitherto if the Bill is passed in its 
current form. As such, the House will wish carefully to consider whether these 
changes pose an undue risk either that individual ministerial responsibility to 
Parliament will be diluted or that legal accountability to the courts will be 
fragmented.”202 
The HLCC’s apprehensions are a clear appeal to the government to consider how limiting the 
responsibility of the Secretary of State would constitutionally undermine the NHS, and to 
reconsider its position on the matter. Consultation with the government resulted in the HLCC 
producing concrete recommendations, the most important being,   
“that the Bill be amended to include a new subsection 1(3) in the 2006 Act as follows: 
Page 2, line 4, at end insert— “( ) The Secretary of State retains ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament for the provision of the health service in England.”203 
The effect of this amendment would be to ensure that the Secretary of State remained 
constitutionally responsible for the NHS through his political accountability to Parliament.     
Unlike the SCOTUS jurisprudence, the HLCC’s reports and recommendations are not 
binding.  The working out of issues thus occurs through the political, rather than legal, 
process.  The government-controlled House of Commons took seriously the HLCC’s warning 
and amended s1 of the HSCA, which now reads “The Secretary of State retains ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament for the provision of the health service in England.”204 The HLCC 
thereby blunted the transfer of power from government minister to department bureaucrat. 
The result of this is that the free market accountability structure the government aimed to 
install by “giving CCGs the confidence to act as market players, free from the fear of 
ministerial 'interference'”205 has been diminished, ensuring that Parliament maintains control 
over the executive, and democratic accountability still counts, even in a marketised NHS. In 
this regard, the HLCC used the constitution to remove the most revolutionary aspect of the 
HSCA, the placing of large sections of the publicly funded healthcare service beyond 
democratic oversight. Like SCOTUS, the HLCC did not condemn the reforms outright on the 
basis of constitutional problems. Rather than recommend wholesale overhaul, the HLCC, like 
SCOTUS, demanded the excision of the most revolutionary elements of reform, whilst 
upholding the rest. 
Policymakers in the US and UK have proceeded to mix aspects of internal system evolution 
with the inclusion of revolutionary concepts imported and adapted from the other’s system. In 
search of healthcare equilibrium, they have introduced notions conventionally conceived as 
abrasive to their own constitutional order.  As a result, we conclude that the healthcare 
systems of the US and UK are converging on the same ground.  
There is another species of equilibrium that must be attained or maintained, however, and that 
is constitutional equilibrium.  In that sense, the actions of both SCOTUS and the HLCC are 
testament to the idea of evolution as opposed to revolution, bringing the necessary 
constitutional perspective, and balance, to the politics of healthcare.  That is to say that each 
jurisdiction’s healthcare system, despite the inclusion of some conceivably contradictory or 
alien concepts on the face of it, is enabled to comport with its plan for politics through the 
constitution’s role as a mechanism for sustaining commitment to certain ideological values 
and ensuring evolution rather than revolution.   
Conclusion 
This paper takes no position on the jurisdictions’ reforms, neither agreeing nor disagreeing 
with opponents or proponents of the respective healthcare systems.  It recognizes that 
healthcare reform is as much about practical politics as it is about principle.  In that context, it 
finds the evolutionary narrative more persuasive than the revolutionary, which manifests 
practical politics to the detriment of principle, albeit that, in that revolutionary narrative, 
practical politics masquerades as an overweening commitment to principle.  It also finds that 
the healthcare systems of the UK and US are not as different as the revolutionary narrative’s 
depiction of the political positions suggests.  There is convergence, an external fact that the 
evolutionary narrative is more able to account for along with its depiction of internal change.  
At the heart of our convergence narrative is how, in order to maintain internal constitutional 
fidelity, reform has been tempered post-hoc by constitutional actors.  Firstly, constitutional 
adjudication has moulded the outer limits of reform, revising or reversing those parts of the 
new healthcare systems perceived to be (too) revolutionary.206 When measured against 
fundamental political principles, as manifested by the constitution, some elements of the 
reforms have been confirmed as fitting within the constitutions’ frameworks, others have not. 
Secondly, through entertaining questions of constitutionality, and supporting certain elements 
of new healthcare systems, constitutional actors implicitly undermine the evolutionary 
narrative.  Convergence enables us to embrace and account for change that is more than 
moderate, linear evolution but which falls short of revolution due to the presence of 
mechanisms of restraint.  Whilst we identify convergence as an important outcome of 
independently undertaken healthcare reform, that convergence is, we conclude, blind.  In 
neither jurisdiction do policymakers know the precise equilibrium between free market and 
state support that will achieve universal access at the lowest cost.  Nor can they envisage 
what overall shape the converged healthcare system will ultimately take.       
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